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Economic Damages in a Products Liability Action:
Where Do We Go From Here?
This comment will provide an overview of the current Pennsyl-
vania law with regard to recovering economic damages in a prod-
ucts liability action. It will examine the appropriateness of al-
lowing recovery in tort where a product malfunctions because of a
defect in the product and the only injury is to the product itself.
The issue, presented here, is whether damages such as repair and
replacement costs and lost profits may be recovered. These are
commonly referred to as economic damages.' The answer to this
issue is not entirely clear and has become a source of legal contro-
versy. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 makes
it clear that recovery of economic damages is permitted where a
defective product causes injury to a person or other property.3
The question of whether one may recover economic damages has
not yet been decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The
only reference to the issue of economic damages in a products lia-
bility action made by the Supreme Court was in an early decision,
Kassab v. Central Soya4 .6 Kassab involved a breach of warranty
action, but the Court by way of dicta suggested that there was no
reason to exclude the recovery of damages to a product itself in a
1. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 60:19 (T. Travers 3d ed. 1987).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. (1965). This section is titled "Special Lia-
bility of Seller of Product to User or Consumer" and states:
1.One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property if
a)the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b)it is expected to and does reach the user and consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold
2.The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
a)the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
b)the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into a contractual
relation with the seller.
Id.
3. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
4. 432 Pa. 217, 231, 246 A.2d 848, 854 n.7 (1968) (hereinafter Kassab).
5. REM Coal Co., Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 386 Pa. Super 401, 563 A.2d 128, 129
n.2 (1989) (hereinafter REM).
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strict liability action." The Court arrived at this conclusion by pos-
ing a hypothetical situation wherein the purchaser of a gas range
was injured when the range exploded.7 The range itself and the
consumer's kitchen were damaged. s The Court stated that under
section 402A of the Restatement of Torts,9 the range was as much
property as any other possession of the plaintiff which was dam-
aged as a result of a manufacturing flaw.10
Recently the Pennsylvania Superior Court in REM Coal Co.,
Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co." held that strict liability theories did
not apply in an action between commercial enterprises where the
only resulting damage was to the product itself. 2 The Superior
Court followed the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.'
where it was held that damages to the product itself were most
naturally recoverable under contract or warranty theories.' 4
Although REM is the most recent, comprehensive decision in
Pennsylvania dealing with the issue of economic damages in a
products liability action, there are a few cases which preceded it by
a few years which held differently.'6 The alternative theories dis-
cussed by the courts in those cases preceding REM will be
presented herein. This will allow the reader to fully comprehend
the complexities of the issue which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will have to face, should the Court decide to address the
issue of whether or not to allow economic damages in a products
liability action.
The public policy rational which led to tort recoveries in the
area of products liability was a desire to provide protection to the
public from unsafe products in addition to that provided by con-
6. Kassab, 246 A.2d at 854 n.7.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See supra, note 3.
10. Kassab, 246 A.2d at 855 n.7.
11. REM, 563 A.2d at 128.
12. Id. 563 A.2d at 134. This holding applies as well to an action based on a theory of
negligence. Id.
13. 476 U.S. 858, 872-73 (1986) (hereinafter East River). Charterers of supertankers
brought an action against a turbine manufacturer seeking damages resulting from design
and manufacturing defects which caused the supertankers to malfunction in the ocean. Id.
at 2296-97. There was no damage to any other part of the tankers or to any persons. Id. The
plaintiffs were seeking damages for the cost of repairing the ships and for income lost while
they were out of service. Id. at 2295.
14. REM, 563 A.2d at 133.
15. See infra, notes 43, 48.
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tract law.16 "Tort product liability theories impose liability on the
supplier of a defective product which causes either personal injury
or injury to other property because this is the best way to allocate
risk and to encourage safer manufacture and design. '17 The ques-
tion confronting many courts, including Pennsylvania courts, is
whether the public policy behind tort recoveries should be ex-
tended to include damages to only the product? 8 A great majority
of American courts take the position that economic damages, as
that term is generally defined, cannot be recovered in a strict lia-
bility action.19
Traditionally, damages of this sort are specifically recoverable
under contract theories such as breach of warranty.20 Thus a pur-
chaser of a defective product who has not received the benefit of
his or her bargain may recover based on a breach of warranty the-
ory.21 One way to look at current public policy on this issue is to
say that a distinction now exists between tort recovery and con-
tract recovery which rests on the luck of one plaintiff having an
accident causing physical injuries to himself or other property.
22
Another way to look at this distinction is to say that if we allow
such a policy to progress too far, contract law will "drown in a sea
of tort.
2 3
There are three general approaches to deciding the question of
whether injury to a product itself may be remedied through a
products liability tort action. 24 One of these approaches is illus-
trated by Seely v. White Motor Co.25 which classified cases in this
area as falling within the realm of contract law.2" According to this
view, it is unfair to charge a manufacturer with the responsibility
of seeing to it that his product matches the economic expectations
of his consumer. 2 To allow this type of action would subject man-
16. REM, 563 A.2d at 129., Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652
F.2d 1165, 1168 (3rd Cir. 1981) (hereinafter Pennsylvania Glass Sand).
17. REM, 563 A.2d at 129.
18. Id.
19. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTs LIAaILITY § 60:20 (T. Travers 3d ed. 1987).
20. REM, 563 A.2d at 129.
21. Id. The same is true if the purchaser's expectation interest has not been fulfilled.
22. Id. at 130.
23. East River, 476 U.S. at 866.
24. East River, 476 U.S. at 868-69. REM, 563 A.2d at 129-31.
25. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965) (hereinafter Seely).
26. East River, 476 U.S. at 868.
27. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. However "... a consumer should not be charged with
bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market." Id.
In this case, the Plaintiff purchased a truck for his business which did not perform the
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ufacturers to liability for damages of unknown and unlimited
scope.28 "A contract action, on the other hand, is perfectly suited
to providing an adequate remedy for such losses and recognizes the
parties' ability to structure their relative liabilities and expecta-
tions regarding the product's performance by setting the terms of
the contractual bargain."2 9 This view is clearly against allowing re-
covery of economic damages under a tort theory where the only
damages are to the defective product.
A second approach can be seen in Santor v. A and M Karagheu-
sian, Inc.,30 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
strict liability recovery was permissible even in a case involving
only economic loss to the defective product.31 In Santor the plain-
tiff purchased some carpeting from the defendant manufacturer
which was defective.32 The plaintiff sued based on an implied war-
ranty of merchantability theory.3 The trial court found for the
plaintiff even though there was a lack of privity.34 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court in a
unanimous opinion, agreeing with the decision of the Trial Court.35
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Francis, stated that
even though there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff
and defendant an action may still be brought based on strict liabil-
way he wanted it to. Id. at 150. The Plaintiff wanted to recover his commercial losses, lost
profits and a refund of the money he paid on the truck. Id.
The Plaintiff recovered his commercial losses but he did so based on a breach of an.ex-
press warranty. Id. at 148.
28. Seely, 403 P.2d at 150-51. "Application of [the law] on warranties prevents this
result." Id. at 151.
29. REM, 563 A.2d at 129. The failure of the product itself is the "... essence of a
warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its
bargain." East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerican Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 868
(1986). Cases from other jurisdictions have held the same way. See Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 626 F.2d 208 (3d. Cir. 1980); Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube
Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983), Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311
N.W.2d 159 (1981), Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (1977).
30. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (hereinafter Santor).
31. Santor, 207 A.2d at 313.
32. 207 A.2d at 307.
33. 207 A.2d at 307.
34. 207 A.2d at 310. The court recognized that basing a manufacturers liability to ulti-
mate consumers on implied warranties is simply using a convenient legal device or formal-
ism to accomplish a purpose. Id. This conception is somewhat illusory because warranty law
originated from contract law. Id. Ordinarily there is not a contract between a manufacturer
and an ultimate user. Id.
35. Id.
ity.36 A manufacturer must bear all risks associated with placing
defective products on the market, including the risk that the only
injury will be to the product itself.3 7 Thus, even though the plain-
tiff was able to recover, based on an implied warranty of
merchantability, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that
there was another basis of recovery for damages to the product:
strict products liability.
38
The Santor Court rejected the Seely approach because "it is too
arbitrary that economic losses are recoverable where personal inju-
ries are involved or property damage, but not if the product injures
only itself."3 Allowing recovery for economic loss would not lead
to unlimited liability because a manufacturer could plan and take
steps to prevent product failure.40 The Santor approach is not that
uncommon. A majority of United States Courts of Appeal, sitting
in admiralty, have adopted this approach.,'
The third approach comprises cases which would allow a prod-
ucts liability action under certain circumstances where a product
injures only itself. Until recently Pennsylvania court decisions
(both state and federal) fell within this third approach.42 One of
the first state court decisions which adhered to this stance was In-
dustrial Uniform Rental Co., Inc. v. International Harvester Co.43
The appellant in this case brought a strict liability action to re-
cover economic losses suffered as a result of a deterioration of the
product. 4 The Superior Court denied recovery to the plaintiff be-
cause the defect resulted in only progressive deterioration of the
product.45 However, the Court stated that recovery may be had if
the action was between commercial enterprises and the condition
36. Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
37. Id.
38. 207 A.2d at 310. Other courts follow this same approach. See eg. City of LaCrosse
v. Schubert, etc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 44-45, 240 N.W.2d 124, 128 (1976), Emerson G. M. Diesel,
Inc. v. Alaskan Enterprise, 732 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
39. East River, 476 U.S. at 869.
40. Santor, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
41. East River, 476 U.S. at 869.
42. See infra, notes 45, 46, 51, 61.
43. 317 Pa. Super. 65, 463 A.2d 1085 (1983) (hereinafter Industrial).
44. 463 A.2d at 1086-87. The plaintiff purchased several trucks from the defendant
which, three years later, began to break down. Id. at 1095. Inspections of the trucks dis-
closed broken welds for front spring brackets, fractured frame rails, broken spring cross
members, fractured mounting plates for gasoline tank support straps, broken shock absorber
mounts, and twisted support posts. Id.
45. 463 A.2d at 1093. The buyer's cause of action for the economic losses is in breach
of warranty under the U.C.C. Id. Specifically, the remedy lies at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2714 (Purdon 1984). Id. at 1087.
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of the property was one which was potentially dangerous to per-
sons or property. 6 In Industrial Uniform there was no evidence
that the defective condition of the product presented any danger
to persons or other property.4
The Superior Court was confronted with the same issue in John-
son v. General Motors Corp.4 8 and applied its holding in Industrial
to come to the same result.49 The plaintiff in Johnson alleged that
the transmission in her car was defective and as a result subjected
her to "unreasonably dangerous and hazardous conditions and a
high risk of danger."5 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim stat-
ing that there was no real detriment to persons or property.51 This
was a case where the transmission prematurely wore out due to
progressive deterioration and not to an unexpected, sudden occur-
rence. 2 In order to bring an action in tort law alleging damage to
the product itself there must be potential for the product to be
unreasonably dangerous to persons or other property. 53 The Supe-
rior Court's holding in Johnson is in line with the public policy
rational regarding tort recovery in products liability actions: if
there is a potential for harm to the public, tort. law will provide
protection.
An early Third Circuit case, Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co.,5' predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would permit recovery of economic damages in a products
liability action where the only injury was to the defective prod-
uct. 55 The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Glass Sand was seeking recov-
ery for damages to a front end loader which was purchased from
46. 463 A.2d at 1093. The Court borrowed an analysis used by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor, 623 P.2d 324, 330
(1981). Id. at 1092.
47. 463 A.2d at 1093.
48. 349 Pa. Super. 147, 502 A.2d 1317 (1986) (hereinafter Johnson).
49. 502 A.2d at 1323-24. The trial court had cited Industrial for the proposition that
the law in Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim in tort for the recovery of economic loss
alone. Id. at 1320 (quoting the lower court opinion at 5). The Superior Court disagreed with
the trial court's reading of Industrial but agreed with the finding that appellant had failed
to state a cause of action in tort. Id.
50. 502 A.2d at 1322.
51. 502 A.2d at 1323.
.52. Id. The Court concluded that the plaintiff "received a transmission which failed to
perform as expected or was of an unexpected quality." Id.
53. 502 A.2d at 1324.
54. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
55. Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1175. The Court predicted that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would allow an action regardless of whether the plaintiff is an ordi-
nary consumer or a commercial consumer. Id.
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defendant."' The front end loader suddenly caught fire which
caused extensive damage to the product but no one was injured.
57
Judge Adams, writing for the Court, took an interesting ap-
proach in deciding this issue.5 8 In order to determine if damages
should be awarded for items such as repair costs, the court must
identify whether a particular injury amounted to physical damage
or economic loss.5 9 The line of demarcation separating economic
loss and property damage was found by referring to the policies
underlying The Uniform Commercial Code's warranty provisions.6
"Deterioration and other defects of poor quality is considered eco-
nomic loss but sudden and calamitous damage generally results in
property damage recoverable in tort."'" In other words, merely
claiming damages which sound economic in nature is not determi-
native of whether recovery for economic losses will be allowed. The
important consideration is how the damages came about. Judge
Adams found an answer in tort law which traditionally redressed
injuries that were classified as a physical harm. 2
The property damage to the front end loader constituted such a
safety risk and posed a serious risk of harm to people and property
that it was a type of harm which tort law was meant to protect.6
The holding in Pennsylvania Glass Sand basically proposed "a
case by case analysis focusing on the nature of the defect, the type
of risk posed by the defect, and the manner in which the damages
occurred.""'
One of the most recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions,
56. Id. at 1166.
57. Id.
58. Id at 1165. The other judges deciding this case were Circuit Judges Rosenn and
Hunter. Id.
59. Id. at 1173. "Economic loss has been defined as the diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold.' " Id. at 1169, citing Manufacturers' Liability to Re-
mote Purchasers for Economic Loss Damages - Tort or Contract? 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541
(1966).
60. Pennsylvania Glass Sand at 1172 citing Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co., 563 P.2d
248 (Alaska 1977).
61. Id.
62. Pennsylvania Glass Sand at 1170, citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 655
(4th ed. 1971).
63. Pennsylvania Glass Sand at 1174. Other Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions
have held the same way: that is where a defective product poses a serious risk of harm then
recovery is permitted in tort. Cornell Drilling Co, v. Ford Motor Co., 241 Pa. Super. 129, 359
A.2d 822 (1976), MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
64. REM, 563 A.2d at 131.
1990
Duquesne Law Review
REM Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co.6 5 declined to follow the
standard used in Pennsylvania Glass Sand,6 6 Industrial Uni-
form,67 and Johnson.68 As was stated earlier, REM adopted the
reasoning of East River. 9 The standard set forth in East River
bars recovery in tort where the action was between commercial en-
terprises and the only damage was to the product itself, regardless
of whether the defect posed a risk of danger to person, property, or
was the result of a sudden occurrence.7"
East River was an admiralty action which arose due to alleged
defects in the pressure turbines in a number of supertankers man-
ufactured by the defendant. 71 The plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fects caused damage to the turbines and nothing else and sought
recovery for the cost of repairing the turbines and loss of income.72
Their basis for recovery was products liability.73
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court,"
and adopted an approach similar to Seely, holding that a manufac-
turer in a commercial relationship did not have a duty under prod-
ucts liability or negligence theory of tort law to insure a product
against injury to itself.7 5 Where an injury is only to a product itself
then the reasons for imposing a duty in tort are weak and those for
leaving a party to its contractual remedy are strong.76 The Court
was clearly advocating warranty law as the proper method of re-
covery.77 One of the main reasons for doing so was to protect man-
ufacturers from spending vast sums, which would surely result, if a
65. 386 Pa. Super. 401, 563 A.2d 128 (1989).
66. See supra, notes 55-63.
67. See supra, notes 44-47.
68. See supra, notes 49-53.
69. REM, 563 A.2d at 132. The most recent decision, New York State Electric and Gas
Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 387 Pa. Super. 537, 564 A.2d 919 (1989), followed the
holding in REM with little explanation.
70. East River, 476 U.S. at 866-75, 106 S. Ct. at 2300-2304.
71. Id. at 859-60.
72. Id. at 859.
73. Id.
74. 476 U.S. at 859. Other Supreme Court Justices which decided the case were: Chief
Justice Burger and Associate Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Ste-
vens, and O'Connor. Id.
75. East River, 476 U.S. at 870-71. The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted summary judgement for the defendant and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 862.
76. Id. at 871. The safety concerns are lessened when the injury is only to the product.
Id. An injury to a person often results in burdensome costs such as lost time and medical
expenses which can be overwhelming. Id. However, "the increased cost to the public of hold-
ing a manufacturer liable in tort for injuries to the product itself is not justified." Id at 872.
77. Id. at 872-73.
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theory of recovery was permitted based on economic loss. 8
The concern by courts over the potential for infinite liability is
not new to the law of torts. This concern was voiced when other
advances in tort law were made. It came up in the early stages of
the creation of the cause of action for ultrahazardous activities and
strict products liability."9
The facts in REM80 were remarkably similar to those in Penn-
sylvania Glass Sand,"' yet the outcome was entirely different. In
REM the plaintiff brought an action in strict products liability
against the defendant to recover for damages to a front end loader
which suddenly and unexpectedly caught fire.82 The Superior
Court held that Pennsylvania warranty law provided a suitable
framework for enforcing and regulating the expectation of the par-
ties as to the product's 'performance.83 The court also concurred
with the United States Supreme Court in rejecting the standard
used in Industrial Uniform, Johnson and Pennsylvania Glass
Sand.8 4 According to the Superior Court in REM, the above cases
focused attention on the nature of the risk posed by a product de-
spite the fact that in all cases where injury was to the product it-
self, the risk never materialized and the only harm was of a type
contract law should handle. 85 The proper focus was on the actual
harm for which a plaintiff sought recovery and n6t on the type of
risk. 6 To hold otherwise puts courts in the precarious position of
having to draw a line between defects which pose an unreasonable
risk and those which do not.
87
It should be noted that the Superior Court in REM limited its
78. Id. at 874.
79. People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 253-54, 495 A.2d
107, 110-11 (1985).
80. See supra, note 82.
81. See supra, note 56.
82. REM, 563 A.2d at 128. Plaintiff's other causes of action were based on negligence
and breach of warranty. Id. The trial court granted summary judgement against the plaintiff
on the warranty claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. The trial
court denied summary judgement on the negligence and strict liability claims and certified
the denial for immediate appeal stating that the denial involved a controlling question of
law for which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion. Id. at 129.
83. REM, 563 A.2d at 133.
84. Id. See supra, notes 66-68.
85. REM, 563 A.2d at 133.
86. Id.
87. Id. Questions would arise as to"How much need a plaintiff plead to establish a
sufficiently non-speculative risk to avoid a demurrer?" Id. "Must plaintiff establish that an
accident-like event occurred in order to recover, or would the imminence of such an event,
narrowly avoided, be sufficient?" Id.
1990
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holding to actions involving two commercial enterprises. 8 The im-
plication which may be drawn from that holding is that an action
brought by a non-commercial party may succeed under a tort the-
ory. The likely reason for this difference is the possibility of an
unequal bargaining position between an individual consumer and a
commercial manufacturer.
Following the decision in East River, the Third Circuit had the
opportunity to rethink its position regarding this issue. They were
confronted with the same issue and similar facts in Aloe Coal Co.
v. Clark Equipment Co. 89 as they were in Pennsylvania Glass
Sand.s0 Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in
East River, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that the
Pennsylvania courts would adopt the reasoning of East River.1
This prediction came despite the holdings in Industrial Uniform
and Johnson which were decided just prior to the Pennsylvania
Glass Sand decision. 2 The Third Circuit recognized the blatant
inconsistency which exists between their prediction in Pennsylva-
nia Glass Sand and their decision in Aloe.93 Speaking through
Judge Aldisert, the Court said that they were uncomfortable with
the inconsistency but nevertheless believed the East River decision
could be followed in Pennsylvania. 4
With these most recent decisions, it is safe to say that Pennsyl-
vania courts have moved away from an intermediary position and
occupy a stance alongside Seely. In the span of three years, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has gone from permitting recovery
for economic damages under circumstances where the only injury
is to a product,9 5 to not permitting such a recovery. 6
88. Id. at 134, n.4. The limited holding in REM is remarkably similar to a holding by a
Minnesota Court of Appeals. In Nelson v. International Harvester Corp., 394 N.W.2d 578
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The Court in Nelson interpreted a Minnesota Supreme Court deci-
sion, Superwood v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981), as permitting an
action in tort for economic loss by a consumer. Id. at 581.
89. 816 F.2d 110, 111 (3rd Cir. 1987) (hereinafter Aloe).
90. See supra, notes 55-57.
91. Aloe at 111. "In attempting to forecast state law, [the court] '... must consider
relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable
data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue
at hand.' " Id. at 117 (quoting MeKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 633
(3d Cir.), Cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980)).
92. Aloe at 118.
93. Aloe at 119. Nonetheless other decisions have followed in line and have applied
the Aloe holding. See eg. Hammermill Paper Co. v. C. T. Main Const. Inc., 662 F. Supp.
816, 818 (W. D. Pa. 1987).
94. Aloe, 816 F.2d at 119.
95. See supra, note 53.
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It should be noted that the holding in East River is not binding
on Pennsylvania courts, because the Supreme Court's decision was
based on an interpretation of federal admiralty law only. 7 "The
United States Supreme Court is supreme in matters of federal law;
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is supreme in matters of Penn-
sylvania law."9 8 Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is free
to take whatever position it wishes on this issue.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should adopt the approach of
the Superior Court decision in REM. The intermediary approach,
suggested in the earlier Superior Court cases, would create more
problems than allowing recovery under the Santor approach. The
intermediary position which was outlined in Industrial Uniform
allows far too much discretion to the courts which in the long run
would result in inequitable results. This is a subjective approach
because what is potentially dangerous in the eyes of one judge may
not be in the eyes of another. No party to a lawsuit benefits where
the law is unpredictable.
Contract law has remedies in place to take care of situations
where only the product is injured. If a person or commercial entity
wishes to protect themselves from injuries of this nature, then they
can bargain for more effective warranty provisions. Pennsylvania
manufacturers should be able to rely on the rule that they will only
be responsible for loss that is bargained for. This will undoubtedly
drive up the cost of the product to the purchaser, but that is where
the added cost belongs. Under the intermediary and Santor ap-
proach, the manufacturer is burdened with the added costs of pro-
ducing a safe product. This cost would ultimately be spread out
across the consuming public. In the first instance, the public has
the option to pay for added protection; in the second, they do not.
James Girman
96. See supra, note 12.
97. Aloe, 816 F.2d at 117.
98. Id.
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